Not Ignorance, But Monumental Arrogance

Reacting to the demand of Jayalalitha, BJP and some others for his resignation in the wake of the Madras High Court rejecting the plea for dismissal of an election petition against him, an assertive Home Minister P.Chidambaram told journalists in New Delhi on June 6: “Issues have not yet been framed, trial has not yet started and not one witness has been examined. I am astonished by the monumental ignorance displayed by certain political leaders. This is an election petition. There are 111 election petitions filed against members of 15th Lok Sabha,” he said.

Replying to Jayalalitha's charge that he had moved the court out of fear of facing the case and only to delay the process, the Minister said sarcastically: “They [rivals] have not sought adjournments to the trial dozens of times. They have not approached the High Court or the Supreme Court dozens of times. Therefore, they are entitled to make these demands.”

Chidambaram may be correct when he said he was astonished by the ‘monumental ignorance’ displayed by certain political leaders in seeking his resignation in an election petition even before issues had not been framed and trial not yet started and not one witness had been examined. But as far as Jayalalitha is concerned her instant demand for his resignation is not borne out of her monumental ignorance but out her innate monumental arrogance.

Questioning her locus standi to call for the resignation of Chidambaram, DMK President Kalaignar, in keeping with his political maturity, asked whether it was fair for her to demand the resignation of anybody following a court verdict when she herself had a backlog of election and criminal cases against her prolonged for more than a decade by her manoeuvres. Of course, Chidambaram in his inimitable style, has had a dig at her seeking innumerable adjournments and nauseating appeals to High Court and Supreme Court.

The manoeuvres adopted Jayalalitha to overcome her disqualification from contesting elections and how she manipulated to get sworn-in as chief Minister of Tamil Nadu in 2001 only to be unseated by the intervention of the Supreme Court is a black chapter in the legal, constitutional and electoral history of independent India and in the history of democratic world.

There had been plenty of sound and fury over the disqualification of Jayalalitha from contesting elections. Election platforms reverberated with the cut and thrust of arguments; newspapers discussed the Election Commission of India's Order of August 28, 1997, which virtually barred the former Chief Minister from contesting.”

Her papers were rejected also on the ground that Section 33 (7) (b) of the RPA bars candidates from filing nominations from more than two constituencies.

Her disqualification to contest was a major obstacle to her being sworn in Chief Minister even if her party won an absolute majority in the 234-member Assembly. The overwhelming legal opinion was that the Governor cannot have her sworn in Chief Minister even if a victorious ADMK elects her as the leader of the legislature party unless the Madras High Court sets aside her conviction. Senior Advocate N. Natarajan, former Union Finance Minister and lawyer P. Chidambaram, former Tamil Nadu Law Minister and advocate S. Madhavan, and Janata Party president Subramanian Swamy argued that Jayalalitha cannot make use of the provision that allows a person who is sworn in Chief Minister to get elected within six months. Natarajan asked: "When the disqualification starts under the RPA from the date of conviction and continues for six years even after the person serves the sentence, how can she competently get elected? Even after six months, she suffers the same disqualification."

Jayalalitha was convicted and sentenced by P. Anbazhagan, Special Judge, Chennai, on October 9, 2000 to three years' rigorous imprisonment in the "Jaya Publications case", involving a deal for land of the State-owned Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation (TANSI) when she was Chief Minister from 1991 to 1996. In the "Sasi Enterprises case", the same Judge convicted and sentenced her to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Her close friend Sasikala Natarajan received similar sentences. The sentences were handed down to both under Sections 120-B (punishment for criminal conspiracy) and 409 (criminal breach of trust by a public servant or banker, merchant or agent) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and Sections 13 (2) and 13 (1) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Jayalalitha appealed to the High Court, which suspended the sentences and granted her bail in November 2000. But the High Court did not suspend the convictions. She filed writ petitions in April 2001 seeking suspension of the convictions so that she could contest the elections. She, however, did not challenge the Election Commission's order.

Section 8 (3) of the RPA says that "a person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years (other than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) ) shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period six years since his release."

Section 8 (4) of the RPA states that "Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed by the court."

Section 33 (7) (b) of the RPA says that "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (6) or in any other provisions of this Act, a person shall not be nominated as a candidate for election in the case of a general election to the Legislative Assembly of a State (whether or not held simultaneously from all Assembly constituencies) from more than two Assembly constituencies in that State." This provision was introduced in the RPA in 1996.

So Jayalalitha cannot contest elections for a minimum of three years plus six (years after her release), unless the High Court sets aside her conviction. Jayalalitha was not a legislator when she was convicted in the two cases. She was defeated at Bargur in the 1996 Assembly elections.

Kalaignar said he was not happy over the rejection of Jayalalitha's nominations. "The law had done its duty," he said. He stoutly denied that his government had interfered in the rejection. "In a democratic battle, I want to take on the enemy face-to-face. I don't want to fight the enemy after tying his hands." Besides, Kalaignar asked: "If the enemy has willingly trapped herself (by filing her nominations from four constituencies), how can I be held responsible for it ?"

The controversy subsided when the then Chief Election Commissioner Dr. M.S. Gill on April 30 concurred with the decisions taken by the Returning Officers both in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. He said the Election Commission's order of August 28, 1997 had legal backing and the returning officers had correctly interpreted it.

The subject of the Election Commission's Order dated August 28, 1997, No.509/Disqln./97-J.S.I., was "Criminalisation of politics - participation of criminals in the electoral process as candidates - disqualification on conviction for offences - effect of appeal and bail - regarding." It pointed out that "the country was facing the serious problem of criminalisation of politics in which criminals, i.e., persons convicted by courts of law for certain offences, are entering into election fray and contesting as candidates." The Order, however, pointed out that "Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, lays down the conditions under which a person would be disqualified on grounds of conviction for contesting the elections to the Parliament and Legislature of a State..." The Order quoted from the judgments of High Court and the Supreme Court that convicted persons should not be allowed to stand in the election.

The six-page Order said, "Now, therefore, the Election Commission has, after taking due note and paying due regard to the above judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High Courts, come to the considered view that the disqualification under Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 for contesting elections to Parliament and State Legislatures, on conviction for offences mentioned therein, takes effect from the date of conviction by the trial court, irrespective of whether the convicted person is released on bail or not during the pendency of appeal (subject, of course, to the exception in the case of sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures under sub-section (4) of the said section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951).

"Accordingly, the Election Commission, in exercise of its powers of superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament and State Legislatures vested by Article 324 of the Constitution, hereby directs that all the Returning Officers, at the time of scrutiny of nominations, must take note of the above legal position and decide accordingly about the validity or otherwise of the candidature of the contestants disqualified under the said section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951."

M.S. Gill and then Election Commissioner G.V.G. Krishnamurthy reportedly drafted the Order. Gill himself said on April 30 that the Order had quoted extensively from three judgments of the Madhya Pradesh, Allahabad and Himachal Pradesh High Courts. "The Himachal Pradesh High Court (order) was upheld by the Supreme Court. There is no case in which any other court has taken an opposite view", Gill said.

Earlier, appearing for the State, N. Natarajan, Senior Public Prosecutor in the corruption cases against Jayalalitha, contended that the spirit of the RPA's disqualification clauses was that persons convicted for criminal offences should not be allowed to be candidates in elections. Natarajan said that no distinction should be made between political public servants and bureaucratic public servants insofar as the conviction was under the Prevention of Corruption Act because the interest of purity of administration should prevail over any other consideration.

On April 24, when nominations were scrutinised, there was fear of violence but Jayalalitha instructed the ADMK cadres to stay calm. The Returning Officers for Andipatti, Bhuvanigiri, Krishnagiri and Pudukottai, S. Jaya, P. Santhanam, M. Mathivanan and E. Kandasamy respectively, rejected Jayalalitha's nominations either because, under Section 8 (3) of the RPA, her disqualification started from the date of conviction by the trial court or because she filed her nominations from four constituencies or on both the counts.

The Returning Officers rejected arguments from Jayalalitha's counsel including Siddharth Shankar Ray, V. Ramaswami, N. Jothi and K. Malaisamy that the High Court had suspended her sentence and so the Election Commission's Order did not hold good. Jothi and Malaisamy argued that a candidate could file nominations from more than two constituencies but reserved the right to contest in two.

Subramanian Swamy, election agent for V.S. Chandralekha, who had filed her nominations from Andipatti, highlighted three points before the Returning Officer. The first was that Jayalalitha had admitted in her nomination of her being convicted under the PCA for two years (and three years). This attracted Section 8 (3) of the RPA and implied her disqualification from contesting. The second point was that since the Returning Officers were subject to the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission, they should comply with its Order. The third was that the Madras High Court had dismissed her petition seeking a stay on her conviction. Besides, she had never challenged the validity of the Election Commission's Order.

Chidambaram also said there was no way Jayalalitha could become Chief Minister. The convention was that a Minister or a Chief Minister against whom the police filed a charge-sheet would resign. Former Union Minister Sedapatti R. Muthiah and former Bihar Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav resigned under similar circumstances. Chidambaram said: "There is no precedent for a person convicted and sentenced by a court to be sworn in Chief Minister. I have every faith that the Tamil Nadu Governor will respect the Constitution." It was not possible for the Governor who gave the sanction to the State government to prosecute Jayalalitha in the corruption cases to invite her to form the government, Chidambaram said.

Subramanian Swamy said the rule that one should get elected to the legislature within six months of becoming the Chief Minister was applicable only to those who were not disqualified from becoming a member of the legislature.

Former Law Minister S. Madhavan said: "It may be political chicanery to claim that a person barred by the RPA to contest the election can be sworn in Chief Minister. But it will be ruinous for democratic governance." Madhavan said Jayalalitha had filed nominations from four constituencies even after giving an undertaking before the Returning Officer that she had not filed nominations from more than two.

According to Natarajan, lawmakers decided on the qualification and disqualification in an enactment. The object of Section 8 (3) of the RPA was there in the object and reasons of the Act itself, which said that criminalisation of politics should be avoided. "No one till today can say it is wrong. But Section 8 (4) is meant for a totally different situation. It gives weight to the will of the people because it comes into play after a person gets elected to the Assembly or Parliament, and his becoming guilty of a crime after that."

Natarajan added: "If it is felt now that such a person should be immediately disqualified, it is for the people to make proper amendments to that section. In the absence of this, the Election Commission's hands are tied. It has to go by the law that is available."

Tamilnadu went in for a State Election in May 2001. Jayalalitha was disqualified by the Election Commission of India to contest the election as per the People's Representation Act in May 2001. She projected herself as the Chief Ministerial candidate in spite of her disqualification to contest the election. Her part got the simple majority (131 seats out of total 234 seats in the Tamilnadu Assembly) in May 2001. Fathima Beevi, the then Governor of Tamilnadu administered the oath of office to Jayalalitha as the Chief Minister of Tamilnadu on May 14, 2001 in spite of the fact that she can not contest the election and would not be able to get herself elected by the people to the assembly within six months as per the constitution. There were a few Public Interest Litigation (PIL) petitions filed in the Supreme Court questioning the validity of her appointment as the Chief Minister of Tamilnadu. Fathima Beevi justified her decision by saying that the majority party in the assembly elected Jayalalitha as their leader. She also got swayed by her assessment that the law and order in the State would have got deteriorated if Jaya was not administered the oath of office. It is ridiculous that a Governor can take decisions based on his/her pre-supposition that the law and order would deteriorate and (under) estimate the police force that they would not be able to contain the violence if it breaks out. Of course, the Governor has to weigh the situation and take a decision. However, when there is a conflict with Constitution, nothing should dominate the decision-making other then the constitution.

When the PIL related to her appointment as Chief Minister was pending, the Apex Court indicated in an another case involving a sitting Minister in Punjab that no one can continue to be a member of the Assembly/Parliament after 179 days without getting elected by the people. In a yet another case, on August 2, 2001 the judges of the highest court of the land expressed serious concerns over the declining probity in public life and ruled that a convicted person shall not hold any public office till he/she was cleared of all charges by a superior court. In this very caustic judgement, the Bench comprising Justice K T Thomas and Justice S N Variava mentioned "it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level". The Bench observed that the corruption by public servants had acquired a "monstrous dimension" and its "tentacles" had started gripping even the institutions created for the protection of the Republic. These Judges warned that "unless these tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises, the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity". This author refers to this important judgement to make sure that the reader does not relate the public servants to only the politicians. This author's humble submission believes that behind every corruption involving a political conspiracy, there are highly educated bureaucrats without whose help the conspiracy could not have succeeded in compromising the public interest.

In spite of all these indications,  Jayalalitha, who was illegally administered the oath of office on 14th May, did not oblige. She ignored these prior signals and was clinging to the post throwing all decent and democratic norms to the wind. The Apex Court probably expected Ms Jaya to vacate the office, picking up the indications. From September 4, 2001 the five-judge constitutional bench headed by Justice Barucha conducted the hearing till September 13, 2001. While this case which questions her appointment as the Chief Minister was heard, the Supreme Court issued an interim stay on the appeal of Ms Jaya on her conviction in TANSI case in Chennai High Court. The Supreme Court transferred the case from Justice Balasubramanian and ordered that the new judge should hear the case after October1, 2001. All these were clear signals for Ms Jayalalitha. Meanwhile, the MLA from the Andipatti constituency resigned his seat, presumably paving the way for Jayalalitha to contest the by-election. In such a charged political atmosphere, on September 21, 2001 the Apex Court delivered a "Landmark Judgement". This historical judgement rejuvenated the belief over our democratic system.

After being in power for 130 days, on the 21st day of September 2001, Jaya claimed the infamous distinction of being the first Chief Minister in the country who was unseated by the Apex Court. Her cabinet became the first Ministry to have got unseated. The Supreme Court squashed her appointment on the ground that it was against constitution. Although the reports said that Jayalalitha submitted her resignation to the Governor, constitutional experts say that there was no need for resignation after the verdict was delivered, as the verdict came into effect with immediate effect. If she had resigned, she resigned the job, which she was not holding it legally.

The Apex Court, in its landmark judgement stated clearly that according to Article 164 the Governor/President can administer the oath of office to a person as Chief Minister/Prime Minister who is elected by the majority party in the Assembly/Parliament or to the person who in the wisdom of Governor/President enjoys the majority support of the Assembly/Parliament. Article 164 allows the Governor to install a person as Chief Minister although he/she is not a member of the assembly at the time of taking over. However, the Article 173 lists the qualification of the person who can be made the Chief Minister, by which the person installed as the Chief Minister should get elected to the assembly within the six months of assuming Office. The constitution bench also mentioned in its verdict that when the Governor chooses a person to head the cabinet, the credentials of him/her should not be subjected to any disqualification for the Office as mentioned in the Article 191. Many intellectuals predicted a predicament to Constitution if Jaya had to be unseated. They were proven wrong by the judgement wherein it was made clear that all the lawful decisions taken by the unceremoniously unseated cabinet in those 130 days would stay and only the illegal ones would be reversed. We need to compromise for such a pragmatic judgement as the clock cannot be put back. However, it is very important for us to make sure that such aberration of the Constitution would not recur. Otherwise mischievous would have their way even through it may for a short while when the Constitution would be reduced to a silent spectator as it was from May 14 to September 21, 2001.

Jayalalitha was sworn in Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu on May 14, 2001, by M. Fathima Beevi, a former Judge of the Supreme Court who happened then to be the Governor of the State. There were questions of legal rectitude and constitutional propriety involved in the decision, which seemingly eluded the comprehension of the Governor. Ironically though, most editorial writers in the national press easily managed to negotiate these seemingly complex questions without the benefit of legal education, even less with the experience of a tenure on the nation's highest judicial forum.

Fathima Beevi soon found herself evicted from the gubernatorial mansion in Chennai for her failure to exercise any form of ethical oversight over a government she had sworn in without a clear constitutional sanction.

Politically, Jayalalitha was compelled to do under duress what she should have done four months back as a gesture of faith in basic democratic norms. And any pretence of sagacity that she might affect, any effort to portray her impending resignation as a sacrifice of her own interests in the larger cause of safeguarding accountability and probity in public life, would be undermined by a record of reckless adventurism since her political resurrection in the Tamil Nadu Assembly elections.

Indeed, no Chief Minister in India has at any given time been under scrutiny by quite as many constitutional and statutory authorities. Even as the Supreme Court deliberates upon the legitimacy of her claim to remain as Chief Minister, the Madras High Court was hearing appeals against her conviction for corruption, the National Human Rights Commission was inquiring into her arbitrary use of police powers against political adversaries, and the Press Council of India was investigating her efforts to deny the media its rightful democratic space.

For those of a facetious disposition, willing to accede to the demands of convenience, the Indian Constitution is what is made of it by governments, subject only to the occasional restraints of judicial intervention. For those more seriously engaged in politics and the defence of democratic rights, the Constitution embodies weightier principles - it is nothing less in fact than the embodiment of the popular will. The hearings before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on Jayalalithaa's eligibility to be sworn in provided an opportunity to affirm a basic verity of politics: the popular franchise is exercised under the Constitution and cannot in any instance provide a mandate to disregard the central principles of constitutionalism. A convicted person who has failed to secure a suspension of conviction is ineligible to contest elections to any legislative body. And being ineligible to contest, he or she would not be entitled to hold a position of ministerial authority, including that of Chief Minister.

Jayalalitha filed her nomination papers from four different constituencies for the Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu, and was disqualified from all of them. She chose not to contest the decisions of the Returning Officers in the four constituencies through an election petition in the Madras High Court, and assumed office as Chief Minister in the expectation that the basis of her disqualification would be removed in good time for her to secure a seat in the Tamil Nadu Assembly. The Election Commission's 1997 Order has not thus far come under legal challenge. What is more, the Supreme Court has held unequivocally that a suspension of conviction will not be granted in a case involving the PCA. Even if the sentence handed down by a trial court can be suspended during the process of appeal, the individual convicted will be deemed, for all legal purposes, to be under conviction until his or her final appeal is disposed of.

Despite all these vicissitudes, Jayalalithaa assumed office as Chief Minister, only to be challenged through quo warranto petitions in the Madras High Court to vacate office. Similar challenges cropped up in other judicial forums, prompting the Supreme Court to gather all the petitions into its jurisdiction. And after a preliminary hearing of the case in July, a Supreme Court Bench decided to refer all the questions before it to a Constitution Bench.

In hearings before the Constitution Bench which started on September 4, the advocates appearing for Jayalalithaa seem to have taken the tack that she was entitled to assume office as Chief Minister under Article 164(4) of the Constitution. Anybody could assume ministerial office for a period of six months, said K.K. Venugopal, senior counsel appearing for the Chief Minister, without fulfilling the prior condition of being a member of an elected legislative body.

Unfortunately, this did not quite address the substance of the petitions that had been filed before the Supreme Court, one of which argued in its opening paragraph that "(t)here has been no case where Article 164(4) has been utilised for swearing in a Chief Minister who has been disqualified under Election law because of a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act and who has failed to get a stay from the court."

In other words, the Constitution required a Minister or Chief Minister to be a member of an elected legislative body, and at the time she was sworn in Chief Minister, Jayalalithaa was disqualified from membership of a legislative body. The six-month grace period granted to a person otherwise qualified for election to seek membership of a legislative body did not apply here.

Fali S. Nariman, senior counsel for one of the petitioners, submitted before the Bench that the Governor ought to have gone by the fact that on the date of appointment of Jayalalithaa as Chief Minister, she was ineligible to become a member of the legislature. Article 164(4), he said, was only an ad hoc provision and an exception which allowed a ministerial appointee who had the necessary qualifications to acquire membership of the legislature within a period of six months.

Additional Solicitor-General Harish Salve, appearing in assistance of the court, argued that Article 164(4) was only intended for an unqualified person to acquire the necessary qualification. It was a conditional waiver given to a strong constitutional requirement for ministerial status. And in the case of Jayalalithaa the waiver had been wrongly invoked because she was not merely unqualified by virtue of not being a member of the legislature but disqualified from membership by virtue of her conviction.

Similar submissions were made by Attorney-General Soli Sorabjee who appeared in aid of the court, and senior advocates Ashok Desai and Anil Divan who appeared for other petitioners. Counsel for Jayalalithaa apparently took the position that Article 164(4) had a specific purpose, which was to enable an individual who was not a member of the legislature to acquire the necessary qualification for ministerial status within a period of six months. In this respect, the Article did not distinguish between those who were unqualified by virtue of having lost - or not contested - an election, and those who were disqualified by virtue of election law. In other words, the respondent Jayalalithaa could be freed from the legal constraints inhibiting her assumption of ministerial office within the period of six months granted under Article 164(4). That would bestow retrospective legitimacy to the Governor's action in swearing her in.

Senior counsel K.K. Venugopal, appearing for Jayalalithaa, repeatedly emphasised that Article 164(4) did not impose any qualifying requirements for ministerial posts. And where this domain of silence prevailed, the popular will should be allowed to hold sway, he contended. Venugopal's repeated emphases on the popular will led at one stage to a query from Justice S.P. Bharucha, the seniormost member of the Constitution Bench otherwise composed of Justices G.B. Pattanaik, Y.K. Sabharwal, Ruma Pal and Brajesh Kumar. The popular will was irrelevant to the concerns of the court, the Judge said. What was important was the constitutional position.

This observation from the Bench underlines the truth that a franchise exercised under a constitutional order cannot in any circumstances provide a mandate to override the fundamentals of constitutionalism. Constitutional and legal prohibitions exist on Jayalalithaa acquiring membership of a legislative body. Her counsel has contended that there are no similar proscriptions on her becoming a Minister or a Chief Minister. Indeed, the basis of her disqualification could well cease to exist within the six-month period of waiver that has been granted for Ministers to hold office without membership in the legislature. Article 164(4) had no provisions on the qualifications necessary for one to be sworn in Minister or Chief Minister. In this respect it was substantively different from other clauses of the Constitution, which laid down strict qualifying requirements for the posts of President and Governor. Again, while it was true that a Governor's decision in appointing a Chief Minister could be subject to judicial review, this could only be on grounds of arbitrariness, mala fide or failure to exercise appropriate thought. None of these applied in this case since the Governor simply went by an electoral verdict and the decision of a party with a majority in the legislature in swearing in Jayalalithaa Chief Minister.

Strong indications of the mind of the court came from a pointed inquiry directed towards Attorney-General Sorabjee: what would be the consequences if Jayalalithaa's appointment were to be declared void and orders issued for her to vacate office? Sorabjee's response was that certain irreversible actions would, in accordance with the 'doctrine of necessity', have to remain unopened. A Chief Minister's resignation was normally taken to mean that the entire Council of Ministers went with her or him. The new Chief Minister would, however, have the option of retaining the same council or appointing another one of his or her choice.

Democratic politics, it is often said, cannot function as a proprietary business. Nor can political morality be subordinate to the personal insecurities of any politician. Jayalalithaa might have well imagined that the AIADMK victory in the May 2001 Assembly elections was a mandate for her personally to govern. The party is of course a proprietary concern in which she has sole ownership rights. But in terms of democratic principles, the May 2001 verdict was a mandate for the party, which could elect anybody who has the necessary qualifications to lead it in the mission of governing the State. Jayalalithaa's personal insecurities, her own vulnerabilities and her sense of isolation prevented her from seeking this perfectly reasonable recourse in May, 2001. Later, she found from a considerably weakened position that she really had no other option.

The least said the better, about the number of adjournments sought in the trial court and the number of appeals made by Jayalalitha and Sasikala in the Disproportionate Assets case against them and Jayalalitha’s misuse of power to dilute the case under the pretext of reinvestigation by the DVAC immediately after she assumed office in 2001 and 2011. The Supreme Court, the Karnataka High Court and the Special Court in Bangalore have repeatedly pulled up Jayalalitha and her companion for the delaying tactics adopted by them. But a hardcore offender cannot afford to be sensitive to judicial rebukes and public criticism.

Veteran journalist late T.R.Ramasamy, popularly known as TRR, prophetically wrote about Jayalalitha even in the beginning of her political career. During the 1989 Assembly election in Tamil Nadu, there was a four-cornered contest between the Congress alliance, the DMK-led alliance, ADMK (Janaki) led alliance and ADMK (Jayalalitha) led alliance. TRR, a staunch supporter of MGR and his confidante and bitter critic of the DMK and Kalaignar, was disgusted with the factional feud in the ADMK after MGR’s demise, and wrote in support of the Congress alliance in his daily columns in Tamil daily ‘Makkal Kural’ edited by him.  A day prior to the polling he made a fervent appeal to the voters to vote for the Congress. If they had very strong reasons not to vote for the Congress, he asked them to vote for ‘even Karunanidhi’s DMK, but not at all for Jayalalitha’, because Jayalalitha was a ‘political disgust’ (Arasiyal Asingam).

If such a person with so much baggage of logical, moral and ethical turpitude has the audacity to demand the resignation of others even for their remote or no culpability, it is nothing but innate monumental  arrogance!